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Private Power and New Media:
The Case of the Corporate 
Suppression of WikiLeaks and its 
Implications for the Exercise of 
Fundamental Rights on the Internet
ABSTRACT
The focus of this chapter will be the recent conduct of various corporations in withdrawing Internet 
services provided to information portal WikiLeaks in light of the controversy surrounding WikiLeaks’ 
publishing classified documents of correspondence between the US State Department and its diplomatic 
missions around the world in late 2010. The implications for freedom of expression (especially the right 
to access information) on the Internet will be examined in the wake of WikiLeaks, particularly in the 
context of the infringer being a private actor, and one comprising a mono- or oligopoly. The motiva-
tion of these private actors in contributing to the suppression of WikiLeaks will be assessed to examine 
whether it constitutes an example of Birnhack and Elkin-Koren’s “invisible handshake,” i.e. the “emerg-
ing collaboration” between the state and multinational corporations on the Internet that they posit is 
producing “the ultimate threat.” The legal recourse open to WikiLeaks and its users for the infringement 
of fundamental rights will be examined, especially the First Amendment to the US Constitution since the 
geographic location for these events has mostly been the USA. Finally, the postscript to the WikiLeaks 
controversy will be considered: the “information warfare” conducted by hackers will be examined to 
determine whether the exercise of power of these Internet corporations in a way which infringes funda-
mental rights can be checked by technological means, and whether hackers are indeed the true electronic 
defenders of freedom of expression.
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BACKGROUND
In November 2010, the online non-profit media 
organisation WikiLeaks published classified 
documents detailing correspondence between the 
US State department and its diplomatic missions 
around the world, numbering around 250,000 
cables. In order to maximise media exposure, five 
‘old media’ publications (namely the newspapers 
Der Spiegel, El País, Le Monde, The Guardian and 
The New York Times) were given prior access to 
the material on the condition that they complied 
with common deadlines over when the material 
was released, with the result of this being that 
the correspondence was released in parts over 
the course of many days, dominating newspaper 
headlines worldwide. These diplomatic cables 
contained classified information comprising 
comments on world leaders, foreign states, and 
various international and domestic issues.
The reaction to WikiLeaks’ release of these 
classified documents from the American political 
class was generally condemnatory of the decision 
to publish the information publicly, invoking 
national security concerns and jeopardizing US 
interests abroad. There were also reports of the US 
Justice Department considering charging Julian 
Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, with espio-
nage offences based on the release of the cables.
In the wake of the political reaction, there was 
also a response from the corporate world, with 
various companies, such as Amazon, PayPal, Visa, 
and Mastercard, ceasing to continue the provision 
of services to WïkiLeaks.
In light of the above, this chapter will firstly 
provide a detailed description of this corporate 
response to the Wikileaks controversy, prior to 
an assessment of the motivation for these actors 
to contribute to the suppression of WikiLeaks, to 
determine whether it is an example of Birnhack 
and Elkin-Koren’s ‘invisible hand.’ The implica-
tions for freedom of expression on the Internet 
will then be analysed, especially in the situation 
of the infringer being a private actor constituting 
a mono- or oligopoly, before an examination of 
the legal resource open to WikiLeaks and its us-
ers for any infringement of fundamental rights. 
Lastly, the response to this corporate behaviour 
from the hacking community will be considered, 
particularly the Anonymous collective, to deter-
mine whether such exercises of corporate power 
on the Internet can be checked by employing 
technological means and whether hackers really 
are the defenders of online free expression.
THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 
TO WIKILEAKS
Various corporate entities with different links 
to WikiLeaks stopped providing services to the 
organisation subsequent to the release of the US 
Embassy cables. More precise details of these 
instances are provided below.
Amazon.com
Amazon.com, the online company which started 
life selling books, has diversified into various 
other markets, including Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) which offers remote computing services 
over the Internet for other websites or client-based 
applications. WikiLeaks’ website was being hosted 
by Amazon.com via these services prior to the US 
embassy cables controversy, yet on 1 December 
2010, Amazon.com ceased to host the site. At first, 
Amazon.com did not comment on this cessation 
of service, but it subsequently issued a statement 
denying that either the government prompted 
them to stop hosting the site, or that mass-scale 
DDOS attacks prompted the website being taken 
off their servers. The company gave the reason 
for its actions as being that WikiLeaks violated 
AWS’s terms of service, in particular the term 
stipulating that WikiLeaks must have all of the 
rights over the content posted online and that the 
use of this content must not cause injury to any 
person or entity. Amazon.com stated that it was 
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‘clear’ that WikiLeaks did not own or control all 
these rights over this content, and that it was ‘not 
credible’ that WikiLeaks could not have redacted 
the information in a way to ensure that ‘innocent 
people’ were not put in ‘jeopardy.’
Apple
The interaction between Apple and WikiLeaks 
consisted of an application being created for 
Apple’s App Store, which was submitted to the 
App Store on 11 December 2010 and approved for 
sale on 17 December 2010 (Albanesius, 2010). The 
App Store is an online shop where users of Apple 
hardware such as the iPad, iPhone, and iPod Touch 
can browse and download applications for their 
device, some of which are free, some of which 
are available at a cost. The specific WikiLeaks 
App was created by Igor Barinov, a developer not 
associated with WikiLeaks, and was described 
as giving instant access to WikiLeaks’ material. 
Furthermore, $1 from every App purchased would 
be donated to WikiLeaks itself. On 20 December 
2010, the App was removed from sale on the App 
Store. According to Barinov’s Twitter page, Apple 
gave no reason for its decision to cease offering 
the WikiLeaks app for sale.
Bank of America
On 17 December 2010, Bank of America issued a 
statement saying that it would no longer process 
any transactions it believed to be destined for 
WikiLeaks, stating furthermore that its action 
was due to its belief that WikiLeaks may have 
been engaging in activities that were inconsistent 
with the Bank’s internal policies for processing 
payments (Schwartz, 2010).
EveryDNS
EveryDNS, a Domain Name System (DNS) man-
agement service provider which was WikiLeaks’ 
hosting provider in the USA, dropped WikiLeaks 
from its entries on 2 December 2010, claiming in 
a statement that it had done so because the domain 
wikileaks.org had become the target of multiple 
Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS) attacks, 
claiming that these attacks threatened the stability 
of EveryDNS’s infrastructure, and thus threatening 
access to around 500,000 other websites.
MasterCard
In early December 2010, the major payment pro-
cessing company MasterCard announced that it 
would stop processing payments to WikiLeaks, 
with its reason for doing so being that WikiLe-
aks was engaging in illegal activity (McCullagh, 
2010).
PayPal
PayPal, a service which allows payments and 
transfers of money to be made via the Internet, 
announced in a statement dated 3 December 2010 
that it would permanently restrict one of its ac-
counts which was being used to raise funds for 
WikiLeaks, claiming that the account was violat-
ing its Acceptable Use Policy, since the account 
involved activities that ‘encourage[d], promote[d], 
facilitate[d], or instruct[ed] others to engage in 
illegal activity.’
In February 2011, PayPal also suspended the 
account of Courage to Resist, an organisation 
raising money for the legal costs of Bradley Man-
ning (a US army soldier arrested in May 2010 on 
suspicion of providing classified information to 
WikiLeaks—but not related to the US Embassy 
cables) (Indvik, 2011). However, PayPal subse-
quently reversed its decision to suspend the ac-
count, claiming that the suspension had ‘nothing 
to do with WikiLeaks,’ and instead the reason 
was that Courage to Resist had not complied with 
PayPal’s policy regarding non-profit organisations 
being required to link a bank account to their 
PayPal account.
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Tableau Software
Tableau Software, an American computer software 
company, provided data visualisation products to 
WikiLeaks for the contents of the leaked US em-
bassy cables, subsequently removed them from the 
Internet on 1 December 2010. In a statement the 
company said that this was ‘not an easy decision, 
nor one that we took lightly,’ but stated that the 
decision was based on their terms of service (in 
particular, users should not ‘upload, post, email, 
transmit or otherwise make available any content 
that they do not have the right to make available’) 
as well as the company receiving a request from 
Senator Joe Lieberman, the chairman of the Sen-
ate Homeland Security Committee, calling for 
organisations providing services to WikiLeaks 
to terminate their relationship with the website 
(Fink, 2010).
Visa
Visa Inc., another major payment processing 
company, started suspending transactions destined 
for WikiLeaks on 7 December 2010 before carry-
ing out an investigation into the organisation to 
determine whether its behaviour was contrary to 
Visa’s operating rules. Visa Europe Ltd announced 
in January 2011 that it would continue to block 
donations to WikiLeaks until its own investigation 
was completed (which at the time of writing, has 
not yet happened).
A CASE OF THE ‘INVISIBLE’ 
HANDSHAKE?
Having seen the various corporations above cut-
ting off services to WikiLeaks, this section will 
analyse the motivations for their responses to the 
US embassy cables controversy, and determine 
whether it is an instance of Birnhack and Elkin-
Koren’s ‘invisible handshake.’ The section will 
commence with an explanation of what this invis-
ible handshake is, before continuing on to analyse 
these companies’ behaviour in order to make this 
determination.
The ‘Invisible Handshake’
In their seminal article, Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 
identify what they call the ‘invisible handshake’ 
as the convergence of the interests of powerful 
private entities on the Internet and the State. The 
‘handshake’ is ‘invisible’ since the average user/
consumer/citizen is not usually aware of the ex-
tent of the cooperation between these two axes 
of power on the Internet, and this cooperation is 
often fairly clandestine and ‘beyond the reach 
of judicial review.’ Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 
posit that this interaction between government 
and its agencies, and multinational corporations 
produces ‘the ultimate threat’ to users’ freedom 
on the Internet.
This state of affairs has come about due to the 
policies of the governments of various developed 
countries, particularly in North America and Eu-
rope, in adopting the role of regulator regarding the 
communications infrastructure, directing private 
behaviour through the use of rules, and thus in 
practice allowing the emergence of private entities 
in this environment, which exercise control over 
parts of the network. When the State wants to exert 
control over the network, it co-opts these pre-
existing privately managed nodes. Birnhack and 
Elkin-Koren note that the State has become more 
active in the Internet from about 2000 onwards, 
due to ‘its growing significance for commence and 
community,’ and due also to geopolitical develop-
ments such as the use of the Internet by terrorists, 
especially in the wake of 9/11. The State is now 
functioning as an ‘active player’ on the Internet 
instead of a mere regulator, and is also acting using 
the Internet to fulfill its ‘ancient duty of securing 
individual safety and national security.’ To do this, 
the State co-opts private entities operating in the 
various layers of the Internet, either by obliging 
them to comply with State demands (through us-
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ing legislative means) or by offering incentives 
for these entities to do so voluntarily. Although 
this inclination to corporatism is not abnormal 
behaviour from such States in their regulation 
form, until the 2000s such approaches had not 
been seen on the Internet, and the latter method 
of informally incentivising corporations to act in 
ways the governments want places such action 
firmly outside the scope of any administrative law 
checks, such as judicial review. One of the main 
reasons why these private entities are of interest 
to States is that by the nature of the products and 
services they offer, they simultaneously perform a 
monitoring function of the information that passes 
through their node of control, in particular being 
able to identify real-world, offline characteristics 
of the user.
Furthermore, Birnhack and Elkin-Koren argue 
that increased concentration in Internet markets 
and increased entry costs due in part to potential 
liability for users’ behaviour (principally in the 
US) has limited competition between corporations 
on the Internet, and so limited options for users, 
and this is convenient for States since markets 
which are more concentrated are easier to gov-
ern. In addition, the potential liability of online 
service providers at least encourages and at most 
forces these Internet corporations also to exercise 
a policing function over their users, turning them 
into private enforcement agents.
The Motivation for Cutting 
off WikiLeaks
The companies considered above gave three types 
of reason for their decisions to suspend services to 
WikiLeaks: (suspected) violation by WikiLeaks of 
the company’s terms of service; (danger of) dam-
age to the company’s technical infrastructure; and 
pressure from the US government, particularly in 
the form of Senator Joe Lieberman, to sever ties 
with WikiLeaks. Apple is the only company not to 
have given any reason for pulling the WikiLeaks 
app from its App Store.
EveryDNS was the only company that explic-
itly stated that it had terminated its relationship 
with WikiLeaks due to infrastructural reasons. 
In contrast, Amazon explicitly denied that this 
was a motivation for ending its relationship with 
WikiLeaks.
Tableau Software explicitly stated that part of 
its motivation to terminate its relationship with 
WikiLeaks was due to the request it received 
from Senator Lieberman requesting it to do so. 
The decision to do so was strongly criticised by 
James Ball, who created the visualisation, claiming 
it ‘smack[ed] of cowardice and blind censorship’ 
(Arthur, 2010).
The other companies claimed that their motiva-
tion for ceasing to provide services to WikiLeaks 
was due to its behaviour (potentially) violating 
their internal policies, either because WikiLeaks 
did not have rights over the content, the publication 
of the content could endanger ‘innocent people’ 
(i.e. those persons whose names were mentioned 
in the leaked cables), or because WikiLeaks was 
more generally engaged in ‘illegal’ activity or 
encouraging others to engage in illegal activity 
(i.e. the actual leaking or dissemination of the leak 
of classified documents). However, these claims 
of illegality or lack of rights over the content are 
mere allegations since there has been no authorita-
tive legal pronouncement on the matters, and the 
claims regarding the jeopardisation of the safety 
of individuals are also mere speculation. Further-
more, even if an illegal act was committed by the 
person who leaked the information to WikiLeaks, 
it would seem that WikiLeaks in disseminating 
that information enjoys the protection of the First 
Amendment vis-à-vis prosecution by the US Gov-
ernment (Benkler, 2011). Nevertheless, the signals 
coming from Senator Lieberman were highly 
condemnatory of any corporate collaboration 
with WikiLeaks: even though Amazon claimed 
its decision was wholly based on a potential vio-
lation of its terms of service, it had been in close 
contact with Senator Lieberman when coming 
to its decision, and the Senator himself issued a 
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statement saying that this was ‘the right decision’ 
and ‘should set the standard for other companies.’ 
Moreover, it is unclear what kind and amount of 
pressure was put on Amazon ‘behind the scenes’ 
by Senator Lieberman and his staff to sever its ties 
with WikiLeaks—indeed, the Guardian claimed 
Amazon was put under ‘heavy political pressure’ 
to stop hosting WikiLeaks (MacAskill, 2010).
The Invisible Handshake in Cutting 
off Services to WikiLeaks?
Although none of the corporations examined were 
legally obliged to cut off services to WikiLeaks 
(e.g. none of them were served with a legal in-
strument specifically forcing them to do so), and 
despite the fact that some of them explicitly stated 
that government pressure was not a reason for 
ceasing their relationship with WikiLeaks, there 
does appear to be in practice a manifestation of 
the invisible handshake between these corpora-
tions and the (US) government over WikiLeaks. 
The rhetoric of the US political class at the time 
was almost entirely against WikiLeaks’ behaviour, 
with the more sober coming from inter alia the 
White House (which issued a statement saying 
that WikiLeaks had ‘put at risk our diplomats, 
intelligence professionals, and people around the 
world who come to the United States for assistance 
in promoting democracy and open government,’ 
terming WikiLeaks’ behaviour ‘reckless and 
dangerous action’), and US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton (saying that WikiLeaks’ disclosure 
of this information ‘puts people’s lives in danger, 
threatens our national security and undermines 
our efforts to work with other countries to solve 
shared problems’) (Jackson, 2010), to the more 
emotive, such as Senator Mitch McConnell, US 
Senate Minority Leader, who called founder of 
WikiLeaks Julian Assange ‘a high-tech terrorist’ 
and said he should ‘be prosecuted to the fullest 
extent of the law’ (Curry, 2010). Furthermore, 
there has been speculation about the possibility 
of a secret US grand jury espionage investigation 
into WikiLeaks (Beaumont, 2011).
Thus, there would appear to be at least a 
climate of moral and political if not yet legal 
condemnation of WikiLeaks’ behaviour generated 
by the US government, and at most pressure and 
threats applied to the corporations facilitating 
the functioning of WikiLeaks. The corporations’ 
response in cutting off these services to WikiLeaks 
would appear to fit into the conceptualisation of 
the invisible handshake as corporations being 
obliged or strongly encouraged by the government 
(with the possible threat of legal proceedings if 
the corporations do not comply with the govern-
ment’s demands). In this way, by co-opting these 
private entities and their nodes of control, the US 
government has been able to make the functioning 
of WikiLeaks much more difficult (although not 
impossible, as despite the withdrawal of these 
services, WikiLeaks was still accessible on the 
Internet). Although, as mentioned above, this kind 
of behaviour from governments vis-à-vis corpora-
tions and vice versa is not unheard of, instances 
of this happening on the Internet are growing in 
prominence, especially since in the 1990s such 
government/corporate control seemed unlikely. 
Indeed, this may be an attempt by governments 
of liberal democracies which place a strong em-
phasis on market mechanisms, such as the US, 
to manipulate the functioning of the Internet to 
approximate a new manifestation of Herman and 
Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model’ of the mass media.
Indeed, Birnhack and Elkin-Koren themselves 
have commented on the case of WikiLeaks and the 
corporate response, and themselves identify it as 
‘a demonstration of an unholy alliance between 
government and large private corporations.’ They 
note the ‘shaky legal ground’ on which the US gov-
ernment is standing when it comes to the legality of 
WikiLeaks’ behaviour since, as mentioned above, 
even if the leak itself was illegal, its dissemination 
by a receiver of the leak such as WikiLeaks would 
seemingly be perfectly legal, and indeed protected 
from government interference by the free speech 
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guarantees under the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution. However, attempts by private entities 
to cut off services to WikiLeaks are not subject 
to such Constitutional constraints protecting free 
expression and so constitute a more effective way 
of containing the leak.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ONLINE 
FREE EXPRESSION AND LEGAL 
RECOURSE FOR WIKILEAKS
In light of the above analysis on the corporate 
response to WikiLeaks constituting an example 
of the invisible handshake, this section examines 
the implications of this government co-optation of 
corporations for free expression on the Internet, 
looking in particular at what happens when the 
market in question is oligopolistic or dominated 
by one firm, such as the cases of the payment 
processing firms and Apple’s App Store respec-
tively. The legal recourse open to WikiLeaks and 
its users for any infringement of their fundamental 
rights will then be considered.
The Implications of the Corporate 
Response to WikiLeaks 
for Online Expression
As mentioned in the previous section, the practi-
cal effect of these corporations cutting services to 
WikiLeaks is to stifle the freedom of expression 
of WikiLeaks itself, as well as the right of its us-
ers to receive this information. However, since 
these corporations are private entities, they are 
not subject in the same way as State agencies to 
the constraints contained in the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution or for that matter Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) protecting free expression in Europe 
(the US and Europe being the primary arenas 
of the WikiLeaks controversy, the geographical 
locations of most of the actors involved, whether 
government, corporate, civil society, or human 
individual—and so the jurisdictional focus of 
this piece). This issue extends beyond the scope 
of this particular incident involving WikiLeaks, 
and in fact highlights the extent of private enti-
ties’ control over the Internet and the information 
disseminated over it. This gives cause for concern 
over civil liberties online: as MacKinnon puts it, 
‘[w]hat is troubling and dangerous is that in the 
internet age, public discourse increasingly depends 
on digital spaces created, owned and operated by 
private companies.’
The relationship between Internet users 
(whether organisations such as WikiLeaks or 
individuals) and these Internet corporations offer-
ing products and services is governed by private 
arrangements (usually contract), in which (not-
withstanding consumer protection law inserting 
certain terms into such contractual arrangements) 
the parties can stipulate the terms they wish and 
do not prima facie have to concern themselves 
with constitutional or treaty provisions on free 
expression. This is demonstrated in the corpora-
tions dealing with WikiLeaks giving as a reason 
for ceasing the provision of services as being 
WikiLeaks’ (alleged) violation of their terms of 
service, to which WikiLeaks, when commenc-
ing using these services, agreed, and by which 
so was bound.
Yet, the logic of competitive markets for 
goods and services would suggest that even if 
the companies dealing with WikiLeaks cut off 
their services to the organisation, all is not lost: 
WikiLeaks merely needs to venture out again 
into the marketplace to obtain these services from 
competitors of these companies, which given 
WikiLeaks’ demand for such services, ought to 
want to supply them.
However, if the market in question is not so 
competitive, either possessing an oligopoly or 
monopoly and if these corporations decide not 
to provide services to an organisation such as 
WikiLeaks, then WikiLeaks is in practice unable 
to procure these services from other sources and 
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is effectively unable to disseminate the informa-
tion it wants.
In the corporate responses above, the situation 
with the payment processing firms bears some 
resemblance to an oligopoly: the effect of Visa, 
Mastercard, PayPal, and the Bank of America 
refusing to process payments for WikiLeaks 
dramatically reduced the possibility of donating 
to WikiLeaks. Indeed, it took mobile payment 
company Xipwire’s positive action to facilitate 
payments to WikiLeaks for there to be a guarantee 
that those who wished could donate to the organi-
sation (although this would appear to show that 
there are no, or low, entry barriers to this market) 
(Petrucci, 2010). Thus, the power of such com-
panies as Visa and Mastercard in the markets for 
payment processing, and in particular the level of 
control they can assert especially when combined, 
can be demonstrated by the fact that there have 
been various groups of legal proceedings against 
the two companies in both the US and the European 
Union for anticompetitive behaviour due to their 
large market shares. Furthermore, in light of these 
two companies cutting off services to WikiLeaks, 
members of the Dutch D66 political party in the 
European Parliament expressed fresh concerns 
over the companies’ level of dominance in the 
European market, and in particular the implicit 
illegitimacy of the American influence over the 
blocking of payments from European citizens to 
a European organization, i.e. WikiLeaks (Dekker, 
2010).
Moreover, there is the more monopolistic posi-
tion of Apple over its App Store, which withdrew 
the WikiLeaks app in wake of the controversy 
over the US embassy cable leaks. For a user of 
Apple’s iPad, iPhone, and iPod Touch platforms, 
unless they ‘jailbreak’ the device, they can only 
run programmes approved by Apple and available 
via the App Store. ‘Jailbreaking’ one of these 
devices would be prima facie illegal in the US 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as 
violating copyright law; however in July 2010 
the US Copyright Office explicitly recognised an 
exception to the DCMA in this case, following a 
request from the Electronic Frontiers Foundation. 
Nevertheless, this at least gives Apple the power 
to control the Apps that are available to the us-
ers of its devices, and the ability to refuse Apps 
created by developers outside of Apple (such as 
the WikiLeaks App). There is the real potential 
for Apple to favour its Apps made in-house over 
Apps from external sources in an anticompeti-
tive fashion, as well as exert some level of more 
ideological censorship over the kind of Apps that 
are available to the users of Apple devices.
Thus, the existence of a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market worsens the circumstances 
for exercising the right to free expression on the 
Internet: in addition to the fact that constitutional/
treaty guarantees of this right do not provide as 
weighty guarantees against infringements of the 
right by private entities as compared to govern-
ments, the existence of a mono- or oligopoly 
which acts in a way that impinges upon a user’s 
free expression is even more detrimental since this 
denies or at least restricts even more the possibility 
of the user turning to a competitors to facilitate 
her free expression online.
THE LEGAL RECOURSE 
AVAILABLE FOR CORPORATE 
FREE SPEECH VIOLATIONS
Following the analysis above, the legal options 
open to WikiLeaks are considered below.
Legal Guarantees of Free Expression
As mentioned above, the right to free expression is 
protected in the jurisdictions under consideration 
by the First Amendment to the US Constitution 
and Article 10 of the ECHR.
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First Amendment to the US Constitution
The First Amendment has traditionally been 
conceived of as a right enforceable against the 
American government, as opposed to a right 
enforceable against private parties such as corpo-
rations. Indeed, one way in which the American 
and European conceptions of free speech differ 
is that in the US not only is the First Amendment 
not enforceable against private entities such as 
corporations, but they themselves are considered 
to be ‘speakers’ and entitled to enjoy the right as 
well. The European approach centres more on the 
individual human person and is based on the ideas 
of autonomy and human dignity, and involves 
more government regulation of expression, such 
as that emanating from legal as opposed to human 
persons, and hate speech.
Nevertheless, the limitations of this concep-
tion of the right to free expression in the Internet 
environment have been recognised. Yemini (writ-
ing in the context of the net neutrality debate 
but with conclusions on this issue which can be 
applied more widely) critiques the ‘traditional 
bilateral conception’ of the First Amendment as 
the scenario of a conflict between a speaker and 
the [US] government and claims that this makes it 
inadequate for dealing with the ‘multiple-speaker 
environment’ found on the Internet. The issue 
with free expression and private entities in the 
net neutrality debate revolves around the fact that 
Internet Services Providers (which are usually 
private entities in liberal democracies) have the 
technological means to control and manipulate the 
information that Internet users send and receive, 
yet they are not, under the traditional conception 
of free expression, subject to regulation on that 
basis, or indeed proceedings for infringement of 
the right. Yet, as explored above, the other layers 
of the Internet are similarly owned and controlled 
by private entities, which can exert their power 
in ways which are not in accordance with free 
expression. Indeed, Benkler also recognises the 
difficulty in a First Amendment action in these 
circumstances.
Certainly, a direct action against the private 
providers under the current conception of the 
First Amendment is not possible, and it would 
be ‘extremely difficult to bring action against the 
government or its officials’ due to any pressure 
from the government that was applied to these 
private actors being indirect and subtle.
Article 10 of the ECHR
The situation in Europe differs somewhat: Art 10 
of the ECHR protecting free expression is an ob-
ligation primarily pertaining to contracting States, 
and is usually conceived of as a negative freedom. 
Nevertheless, the Article itself has been found to 
have some horizontal, positive effect in the case 
of Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden, a 
dispute between tenants and their landlord over a 
satellite dish the tenants had installed to receive 
Arabic and Farsi language programmes against the 
terms of the tenancy agreement. In this case, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found 
that the applicants’ freedom to receive informa-
tion via satellite broadcast, which formed part of 
Art 10, had been violated as the State, Sweden, 
had ‘failed in their positive obligation to protect 
that right.’ It is possible that the reasoning in this 
decision could also be applied to the freedom to 
receive information on the Internet, and it could be 
argued that Internet users (as opposed to WikiLe-
aks itself) had this right infringed by companies 
such as Amazon refusing to host WikiLeaks. 
However, due to the WikiLeaks website itself 
migrating to different servers, as well as various 
‘mirror sites’ of WikiLeaks appearing in various 
other locations on the Internet, these attempts to 
‘shut down’ WikiLeaks and prevent users access-
ing the information contained in the leaks did not 
work, and the fact that users could still see this 
information would suggest that the Court would 
not find that their right to receive information 
had been violated. Nevertheless, again through 
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the ECHR apparatus, the corporations themselves 
cannot be directly censured for their behaviour.
Alternative Pathways 
for Legal Recourse
Since the most direct legal protections of free 
expression cannot easily if at all be used against 
private entities, other pathways to upholding 
WikiLeaks’ and its users’ rights through the ap-
paratus of private law will be explored below.
Competition Law
Given the semblance of a monopoly in the form 
of Apple and oligopoly in the form of the payment 
processing firms, this part will consider whether 
competition law (‘antitrust’ in the US) can pro-
vide any remedies which would in fact go some 
way to correcting the infringements of freedom 
of expression.
Apple
In its position of control over the App Store, there 
is the possibility that Apple could be shown to be 
a dominant entity. It has complete control over the 
Apps, which appear in its App Store even if they 
are created by other companies or individuals, 
and so could be said to be in a dominant position 
in the market for the provision of these services. 
However, since the practice of ‘jailbreaking’ Apple 
devices has been ruled to be legal in the US and is 
permitted in the EU, consumers can also choose to 
run apps from Apple’s competitors’ own app stores 
on their Apple devices. Nevertheless, if Apple 
is found to exhibit characteristics of a dominant 
position in the markets for apps (and particularly 
the market for apps for Apple devices), such as 
Apple’s market share being enough for it to be 
considered dominant, then perhaps its refusal to 
allow the WikiLeaks app could be characterised 
as an abuse of this dominant position, in particular 
a refusal to deal or supply.
In the EU, a refusal to supply, while not ex-
plicitly listed in Art 102 TFEU (which prohibits 
abuse of a dominant position), has been recognised 
as an abusive practice in the case law. Firstly, it 
would have to be shown that Apple possesses a 
dominant position, which is defined in the United 
Brands case as containing two elements: an ability 
for the undertaking to prevent competition and to 
behave independently of its competitors, custom-
ers and consumers. Apple in its position of control 
over its App Store would appear to occupy such a 
position. However, the relevant market must also 
be defined over which Apple is dominant – this 
could be the market for providing apps for Apple 
devices. Indeed, for Apple devices which have not 
been ‘jailbroken’ Apple is the only player in this 
market, whereas for Apple devices which have 
been jailbroken there are other app providers, so 
an analysis would have to be made of the extent 
to which Apple is dominant by e.g. looking at 
market share. Alternatively, the market for apps 
could be considered a sub-market, as in the Kodak 
case, in which consumers who have bought the 
main product e.g. an iPad are ‘locked in’ to the 
‘sub-market’ i.e. apps from the App Store. Even 
if Apple is not dominant in the ‘primary’ market 
for devices, it could well be judged to be dominant 
in the sub-market.
Nevertheless, on the assumption that Apple is 
dominant in both markets or at least it is dominant 
in the (sub)market for Apps (which would seen 
prima facie to be the case), its decision to cease 
providing access to the WikiLeaks app could 
be characterised as an anticompetitive refusal 
to deal. Since the WikiLeaks app was initially 
available through the App Store, and was then 
suspended, Apple’s action in doing so would thus 
be the termination of an existing supply relation-
ship, as established in the Commercial Solvents 
decision (as opposed to a refusal to supply a new 
customer, for which a distinction is made in the 
case law), resulting in the vertical foreclosure of 
the WikiLeaks app. Economic harm was suffered 
(since the WikiLeaks app was being sold through 
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the App Store, with US$1 from each download 
being donated to the WikiLeaks organisation).
In terms of procedure, there could be public 
enforcement proceedings brought against Apple 
by the European Commission and/or the national 
competition authorities, in addition to private en-
forcement in domestic courts. If the former route 
is pursued, and Apple is found to have engaged 
in anticompetitive behaviour infringing Art 102, 
then large fines can be imposed on Apple by the 
Commission. Regarding the latter route, Art 102 
has direct effect in the legal systems of Member 
States, and since the ECJ’s judgement in Courage 
v Crehan, there has been a right to damages for 
the breach of this Article in the legal systems of 
Member States. The WikiLeaks app may wish to 
seek injunctive relief in the form of an injunction 
to ensure access as an alternative to damages.
As regards the US position, the judiciary 
there has also developed the concept of refusal 
to supply, which in some cases constitutes an 
infringement of the Sherman Act. In light of the 
decision in Verzion v Trinko, it would appear that 
the American courts would follow a similar ap-
proach to their European counterparts in assessing 
the anti-competitive behaviour of Apple vis-à-vis 
the WikiLeaks app.
Payment Processing Firms
The other potential source of a competition claim 
is the behaviour of the payment processing firms 
(Visa, Mastercard, PayPal, and Bank of America) 
in refusing to provide services to WikiLeaks.
The most evident path to pursue here would 
be to show a collective dominance abuse by these 
firms, which in the EU is also contrary to Art 
102. In order to show this, firstly the undertak-
ings must together occupy a dominant position 
in the market, and here the market would be for 
payment processing (perhaps more specifically 
Internet-based payment processing). However, for 
an abuse of collective dominance to exist, there 
would have to be a ‘link’ between the firms, i.e. 
some sort of agreement to behave in this way. This 
would have to be shown, although the ‘agreement’ 
could even be one of the payment firms telling 
the others that it was going to cease authorising 
payments to WikiLeaks. In the absence of such an 
agreement being able to be shown, some sort of 
oligopolistic interdependence between the firms 
could be argued, but the fact that another payment 
firm, Xipwire, managed to ensure that WikiLeaks 
could still receive payments would suggest that 
there were low entry barriers to this market, and 
so the argument of oligopolistic interdependence 
would not hold.
As regards US antitrust law, it would seem to 
be more difficult than in EU competition law to 
show an abuse of collective dominance, as this 
concept is less developed there as compared to 
Europe.
Contract and Tort
Given the nature of the agreements between 
WikiLeaks and the entities providing it with 
services, WikiLeaks may find it easier to obtain 
remedies in the traditional private law areas of 
contract and tort.
In the US context, Benkler recognises con-
tractual actions as a possible route for WikiLeaks, 
based on a wrongful denial of service. He argues 
that the best path to take would be to argue that in 
the contracts WikiLeaks had with the commercial 
service providers, there was an implied contractual 
obligation not to withhold service unreasonably 
or without good faith, and that the obligation of 
good faith may be a sufficient basis for a court to 
examine the conduct of these service providers 
and sanction them for ‘cutting off critical services 
to a client where that is done in order to suppress 
their speech.’
Benkler also considers the possibility of a US 
tort action, in particular the behaviour of these 
service providers being a tortious interference 
with the prospective economic advantage of 
WikiLeaks, but he acknowledges that it may be 
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tenuous to demonstrate the economic advantage 
part of this for ‘voluntary organizations’ such as 
WikiLeaks. Nevertheless, this may be easier to 
demonstrate as regards the payment processing 
organisations since their ceasing of providing 
services to WikiLeaks was evidently aimed at 
preventing WikiLeaks from receiving donations, 
which fund the organisation.
As regards the European picture, WikiLeaks 
would have to seek remedies in national courts 
(since contract and tort are still legal regimes 
mainly pertaining to the Member States’ jurisdic-
tion as opposed to coming under codifying, harmo-
nising Europe-wide instruments). An interesting 
development in the contract law of some European 
countries (especially Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom) is the process of ‘con-
stitutionalisation’ of this area of law through the 
increasing application of fundamental rights to 
this regime. Thus, for example in proceedings for 
breach of contract between two private parties, it 
could be argued that the court should adjudicate 
the dispute in a way, which protects fundamental 
rights. So in proceedings in such jurisdictions, 
WikiLeaks could argue that since its right to free 
expression has been infringed by these service 
providers breaching the contracts they had with 
WikiLeaks; and so a court adjudicating the breach 
ought to decide the case in a way which upholds 
WikiLeaks’ right, taking the fundamental right to 
free expression into consideration when deciding 
whether the breach of contract was wholly unlaw-
ful or could be justified.
THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CABLES 
LEAK: HACKERS AS THE AVENGING 
ANGELS OF ONLINE EXPRESSION?
However, the saga of the corporate response to 
WikiLeaks did not stop at these corporate cessions 
of services. Indeed, there was yet a further extra-
legal reaction, this time coming from the online 
hacking community. This section will analyse the 
hackers’ conduct in particular the Anonymous col-
lective, and determine whether corporate power 
infringing fundamental rights can be checked in 
this way, and whether hackers really are defenders 
of online free expression.
Anonymous e-Vengeance: 
Hackers Strike Back
In its own response to the corporate response to 
WikiLeaks in cutting off services, the Internet 
hacking community started to attack the websites 
of various of the corporate actors involved in this 
conduct, primarily under the ‘Anonymous’ um-
brella. Anonymous is a decentralised, organised 
collective of hackers which acts in concert in an 
anonymous fashion, and over the last few years 
its focus has been actions promoting Internet 
freedom in general and freedom of expression 
online in particular. Anonymous’s attention turned 
to the WikiLeaks controversy, and in particular 
the cessation of services from the payment firms 
under the moniker “Operation Avenge Assange,” 
a substrand of Anonymous’s broader “Operation 
Payback,” which originally comprised Distributed 
Denial Of Service (DDoS) attacks on opponents of 
piracy on the Internet, based on the fact they were 
infringing what Anonymous loosely considers as 
Internet freedom. In a statement on a website used 
by Anonymous, the collective claimed its exten-
sion of Operation Payback to attacking WikiLeaks’ 
former service providers (particularly PayPal, 
which the statement explicitly mentions) was due 
to the censorious affront to online speech that these 
cessations of service represented (Correll, 2010).
After the announcement of the Operation 
Avenge Assange campaign, there was a number 
of DDoS attacks on the websites of the payment 
processing firms (and also EveryDNS, on 7 De-
cember 2010): Mastercard and Visa’s websites 
were attacked on 8 December 2010, and on 9 and 10 
December, two PayPal websites (thepaypalblog.
com and api.paypal.com [port 443], respectively) 
were attacked, all being successfully brought 
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down i.e. unavailable to Internet users for varying 
periods of time, which disrupted the companies’ 
services as a result (Addley & Halliday, 2010). 
There was also an unsuccessful attack on Ama-
zon’s website, which was aborted due to the fact 
it did not have an impact on the performance of 
Amazon’s website due to its huge web-hosting 
capacity (Mutton, 2010).
Hackers as David against the 
Corporate Goliath in the Fight 
for Online Free Expression?
Certainly, the actions of the decentralised yet co-
ordinated hackers against the corporations, which 
cut off services to WikiLeaks, did manage to cause 
at least some disruption to the normal functioning 
of these entities, and gained a lot of publicity in 
doing so, compounding the negative media im-
age of the companies. Indeed, Anonymous itself 
seems to have ‘come of age,’ transitioning from 
‘cyberpranksters’ to full-blown ‘hacktivists,’ using 
the same technical tools as industrial hackers for 
more explicitly political or ideological campaigns 
which are able to cause more damage to the sys-
tems of the targets (Cohen, 2010).
However, hacker groups such as Anonymous, 
especially given its seemingly horizontal control 
structure, are by their nature arbitrary: as regards 
free expression, it happens to be that they are af-
fronted by the de facto restrictions on this right 
being exercised by WikiLeaks and its users, but 
they could easily shift their focus to another 
topic entirely, or act in a way themselves that 
infringes free expression, or other fundamental 
rights such as privacy. As regards the protection 
of free expression, or actions against infringers, 
hacker groups are not accountable or reliable in 
conducting these activities.
Furthermore, hackers themselves could be 
considered to be a type of “cyber-elite,” or 21st 
century “digerati,”1 since they have the technical 
power to conduct these kinds of cyber-attacks, 
and so require a certain amount of technical 
expertise, which may be beyond the skills of 
most normal Internet users. However, in order 
to participate in these recent attacks coordinated 
via Anonymous, less technical knowledge seems 
to be necessary, so less technically-literate users 
can get involved – indeed, in some cases users 
merely needed to download a programme from 
one of the Anonymous websites and press ‘Run’ 
once they had done so in order to participate. 
Nevertheless, the less technically literate seem 
not to be so competent in covering their electronic 
tracks when participating in such initiatives (which 
would seemingly fall under the criminalisation of 
this conduct in various countries as constituting 
misuses of computing equipment), and there may 
yet be a distinction based on technical expertise 
inasmuch as the more sophisticated hackers are 
less likely to be apprehended by law enforcement 
agencies as they can ‘anonymise’ more effectively 
their online activity.
Nevertheless, the hackers’ response to the 
WikiLeaks saga shows that these Internet corpo-
rations are not entirely unstoppable behemoths 
in their conduct affecting free expression. While 
the legal regimes in place in the US and Europe 
may not provide wholly adequate remedies for 
free speech violations by private actors, the hack-
ers’ activity shows that there are extra-legal, civil 
society- based means of expressing discontent at 
such infringements, and indeed ways of ‘punish-
ing’ violators. However, the problems with this 
approach is the ‘mob justice’ nature of entities such 
as Anonymous, with their lack of accountability, 
legitimacy and reliability, and so they cannot 
be considered as sustainable and fair means of 
enforcing and protecting free expression on the 
Internet vis-à-vis corporations.
CONCLUSION
So, where does all of this leave online free ex-
pression? The corporate response to WikiLeaks’ 
release of the US embassy cables highlights the 
94
Private Power and New Media
fact that the current conceptions of free expres-
sion are inadequate for the Internet context, where 
expression depends on an increasingly privatised 
sphere. As has been seen with the counter-action 
from Anonymous, there has been a thankful 
coincidence that there is some reproach for the 
corporations’ behaviour from the hacking com-
munity—but, as detailed above, this is arbitrary, 
unreliable and capricious, as well as not preventing 
any similar future action in the same vein.
Pragmatically, entities such as WikiLeaks still 
retain the possibility of jurisdiction-shopping for 
the most favourable (virtual or physical) climate 
for online free expression, e.g. by using servers 
based in such a jurisdiction, and engaging the 
services of companies also based there. For the 
continued and future enjoyment of free expression 
online, there is some hope on the horizon in the 
form of schemes such as Iceland’s Modern Media 
Initiative, which provides various legal guarantees 
and protections for freedom of information and 
expression online, and was in fact endorsed by 
WikiLeaks itself.
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ENDNOTE
1  “Digerati” is a term coined in the early days 
of the publicly available Internet to describe 
users who were highly skilled in the process-
ing and manipulation of digital information. 
The term seems to have fallen out of use in 
recent times.
